Ukraine’s daring move will do little to alter a war of attrition

Kyiv’s dramatic incursion into Russia in early August is widely seen as a spectacular attempt to reframe the narrative of the Ukraine conflict. However, about 900 days after the Russians launched their invasion, the most likely outcome remains a continued war of attrition, at least until the November US presidential election, which could prove to be a “game-changer.”
The surprise Kursk offensive has resulted in the greatest loss of western Russian territory since the Second World War. Ukraine claimed this week that it had captured more than 100 small-sized settlements, taken about 600 Russian military personnel prisoner, and seized over 1,000 sq. km of territory, forcing tens of thousands of Russians from their homes. Kyiv has targeted this border area, around 200 km northwest of the closest front line in Kharkiv, and 350 km from the main front, because it was weakly defended.
To put the territorial gains into perspective, the amount of land seized is similar to that occupied by Russia in Ukraine so far this year. However, it is much smaller than the 100,000 sq. km — around 20 percent of Ukraine’s total homeland — taken by Russia in recent years.
Ukraine’s daring move may not ultimately turn out to be a decisive factor in the war, but it has changed, at least temporarily, the story so far in 2024 of steady Russian gains in Ukraine.
The offensive deep into the Kursk region adds to the challenges facing Moscow. After a troubled two-and-a-half-year campaign, unverified estimates this month from the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces indicate Moscow has lost about 600,000 troops.
Ukraine also asserts that Russia has also lost about 8,500 tanks, 16,500 armored fighting vehicles, 23,000 vehicles and fuel tanks, 17,000 artillery systems, 1,150 multiple-launch rocket systems, 900 air defense systems, 360 aircraft, 330 helicopters, almost 30 warships and boats, and one submarine. This underlines how the war has not gone to plan despite Moscow hoping for a victory within days.
Yet, many military experts are skeptical that Kyiv’s latest bold move will fundamentally change the course of the war, with Russian forces still on the offensive in Ukraine. Russia is estimated to have hundreds of thousands of troops on the front line, so diverting a few thousand may not have a large impact. This means Ukraine may be unable to hold its new Russian territory in the long term as a potential bargaining chip in any future peace negotiations.

Even in the event of a Harris presidency, there is every possibility that Ukraine will fail to achieve all of its strategic war objectives. 

Andrew Hammond

In this context, the most likely scenario remains a continued war of attrition, at least until the US presidential election. At that point it will be clear if US support for Kyiv will probably remain steadfast, under a Kamala Harris administration, or potentially open to complete reversal under a second Donald Trump presidency.
A Harris leadership is most likely to broadly continue the Biden administration’s policy — avoiding escalation, and providing military assistance only in small amounts to try to avoid direct confrontation with Russia — meaning the war may become more protracted.
However, a big Republican win could see Trump try to make good on his wholly unrealistic pledge to “end the war in 24 hours.” This could result in him seeking to cut off support for Kyiv, a fear that has only grown since the selection of Sen. J.D. Vance as his running mate, with his comments that “I don’t really care what happens to Ukraine one way or another,” and “the American people will not tolerate another endless war, and neither will I.”
It remains unclear what a Trump policy toward Ukraine would exactly look like. However, there is no question that it could be hugely different to that of team Biden. That is why there is so much Ukraine policy uncertainty emanating from the US presidential election. Hence, why Kyiv and its allies are undertaking much planning of scenarios for 2025 and beyond.
Even in the event of a Harris presidency, there is every possibility that Ukraine would fail to achieve all of its strategic war objectives. If Republicans control one or more chambers of Congress, for instance, there could be significant attempts to frustrate Harris’ full policy ambitions.
A growing number of Western experts share the view of Lord Ricketts, a former UK national security adviser, who highlights the possibility of a Korea-style scenario. This would result in Russia keeping control of perhaps around a fifth of pre-war Ukraine, the amount of territory it controls today, and the remainder moving in pro-Western direction in the years to come.
However, even this scenario might appear unrealistic under a Trump presidency. What Washington’s allies, especially those in Europe, particularly want to avoid is any result that is perceived as a big Russian victory, which it is feared would only embolden Moscow and its allies across the world.
This is why US allies are thinking through how they might be able to “buy Ukraine time” in 2025 under a potential second Trump presidency. What the Brussels-based club has done, already, is move forward with around half the previously promised aid to Ukraine — €50 billion ($55 million) over the next four years — in order to offer Kyiv more predictability with its strained budget.
Ukraine’s offensive is changing the narrative about the war, but is unlikely to fundamentally affect the course of the conflict. More important, potentially, could be the result of the US election in November, with possibly huge differences between a Trump and a Harris administration.

• Andrew Hammond is an Associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.